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The Philosophy of Natural Law
of St. Thomas Aquinas
MIRIAM

T

T. ROONEYt

of the 3rd annual Natural Law Conference
of the Catholic Lawyers Guild of New York was the fact that it had
as its main theme the practical application of Thomistic principles in
respect to the virtue of Justice rather than merely their general consideration. The following introductory remarks of Dean Miriam Teresa
Rooney should serve as a necessary philosophical supplement to such
a program which had the solution of current, concrete social problems
as its basic object. It was taken for granted by the speakers who dealt
with Distributive, Commutative, Legal and Social Justice that St.
Thomas provided the most exemplary expression of the traditional
wisdom of Western morality. Dean Rooney's excellent summary of
his fundamental teachings is therefore a logical preliminary to their
approach which was based in the main upon the language and concepts of our time.
HE UNUSUAL FEATURE

Jurists and philosophers who are well read in current literature about
legal theory are aware of at least three currents flowing into the main channel. From one side there is the failing strain of a once vigorous positivism:
from the other, there is the prevailing current of sociological jurisprudence - said to be an improvement on the narrow lines of positivism but exaggerating the social aspects of law at the expense of the personal;
and toward the center is the new-found stream called natural law, which
is hailed from one side by positivists disillusioned by the Nuremberg
trials, and from the other by those who would protect human rights
from suppression by the sometimes overwhelming pressures of society.
Positivism has been long and ably expounded, so that few who have
been graduated from our better law schools are free from its claims.
Sociological jurisprudence, being newer, is not yet widely understood in
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its fullest implications, but it has given rise
to a learned and impressive literature in the
last forty years, which has won the adherence of many of the ablest of the younger
leaders of Bench and Bar. The revival of
natural law-noted by some, advocated by

example, W. Friedmann, in reviewing the
volume in honor of Roscoe Pound entitled Interpretationsof Legal Philosophy,1
comments upon the failure to discuss the
neo-scholastic philosophies of law in that
symposium. Another English writer, H. L.
A. Hart, said:
It is surprising to find how small a contribution to English Jurisprudence in these
years has been made by writers in the natural law tradition, for it might have been
expected that the extension of state activities into the sphere of the individual would
have provoked some vigorous restatement
at least of Catholic natural law doctrines. 2
And Professor Lon Fuller, of Harvard Law
School, in reviewing Reuschlein's Jurisprudence, Its American Prophets, asks:
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others, and challenged by a few outspoken
critics-is a more or less unknown-or at
least a rather widely misunderstood, but
recent-development in contemporary jurisprudence. From those who view it as
little more than a recurrent swing of the
pendulum away from strict law and toward
equity, to those who view it as a sinister
attack upon the liberty under law which
others believe would not exist but for the
doctrine of natural law, there is the widest
possible diversity of opinion and an incipient literature. Unfortunately there has
been nowhere nearly enough written as
yet to inform honest inquirers on any side
as to what the natural law can offer toward the solution of contemporary legal
problems.
Writers seriously concerned about current developments in legal thinking have
noticed this gap in our publications. For

What does the neo-Thomist philosophy
say about such questions as the interpretation of statutes, the proper role of the
judiciary, or the methods of reconciling
freedom and control in our complex
modern society? 3
It would seem, therefore, that an Institute
such as this one on the Natural Law and
Justice needs no apology, but rather encouragement in undertaking to meet a deepfelt need.
The project of providing a clear exposition of the relation of natural law to justice, no matter how desirable, presents
many complexities, however, and this may
account for the scarcity of adequate studies
on the subject. The most formidable question is where to start. As far back as the
history of law goes, philosophers like
Plato and Aristotle have written about
natural law. The pages of Sacred Scripture
1 64 L. Q. REV. 545-549 (1948).
2 2AM. J. COMP. L. 355-364, 362 (1953).

3 12 LA. L. REV. 531-535 (1952).
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from Moses to Paul are filled with allusions
to it. Not only jurists and philosophers,
but conquerors and revolutionaries, have
sought justification for their activities in
the name of the natural law. Is it fair to
assume that all are talking about the same
thing? If so, how can the disparities be
reconciled and the confusion dispelled? It
may well be that many of those who talk
about the natural law, like those who call
out, "Lord, Lord," will not ultimately b
found among the elect. If that is the case,
the next question that may be asked is
what criterion can be established upon
which a selection can be made.
The necessity of setting up one particular standard or criterion to the exclusion
of all others is particularly obvious in reading recent challenges to the natural law.
For example, in an admirably tempered
article in the May issue of the American
Bar Association Journal, Professor George
W. Goble of Illinois University Law School
expresses a position about the limits of
human reason which is shared by most of
us, and then lapses into a non sequitur by
attributing absolutism to adherents of the
natural law school. He thereby beats a
straw man of his own creation, instead of
a live flesh and blood enemy of liberty
under law he apparently aimed to discredit.
An even more distressing critique, because
based upon hearsay evidence rather than
primary documentary sources, (e.g., he
relies on the Encyclopedia Britannica for
his knowledge of what the Papacy stands
for, instead of citing official documents something he would never do in referring
to the United States Supreme Court), is
the rejection of the natural law position
presented by Eugene Gerhart, first in the
New York University Law Quarterly Re-

view in 1951, and wbsequently in a book
entitled American Liberty and Natural

Law, which appeared in 1953. 4 For Mr.
Gerhart, the question is not whether such
a thing as natural law exists, but rather,
whose interpretation of it is to be given
force and effect. He is exceedingly fearful
that some authoritarian or absolutist interpretation of the natural law is being advocated which may ultimately set aside the
American Constitution and the liberties it
guarantees instead of strengthening them.
It is a horrible prospect that he visions but
one which fortunately is not likely to happen here as long as most of us lawyers
who are sworn to ,support the United States
Constitution no less than he, remember
that vigilance is the price of liberty. Less
temperate than Professor Goble, Mr. Gerhart nevertheless falls into a similar error
of flaying a straw man of his own creation
instead of winning modem adherents of a
natural law philosophy away from their
advocacy of the cause.
The fact of the matter is that neither
Mr. Goble nor Mr. Gerhart have done a
fair job of ascertaining what is currently
being proposed by those who recommend
a re-study and re-application of natural law
principles in confronting present day community problems. Although the lack of
information about the natural law position
evidenced by both men is quite obvious,
especially since they have undertaken to
challenge the position seriously in learned
and scholarly periodicals, nevertheless they
may not be entirely to blame, since busy
lawyers can hardly be expected to devote
the time and attention necessary to acquire
a mastery of medieval sources, some of
which are still in the Latin language, and
4 Boston, Beacon Press.
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all of which are written in. a style not
easily comprehended by those untrained in
scientific medieval terminology. Perhaps a
little of the blame for this lack of information must be shared by those of us who
have failed to do our part in making what
literature there is more readily available,
or who have neglected to spell out in simple
A B C's what it is that we find acceptable in
the natural law school of thought. The
corrective would seem to be to pay less
attention to the misunderstandings of the
critics and more to making our own convictions intelligible. In this way, a fairer
hearing may be anticipated from that reasonable man to whom we all necessarily
appeal whenever we undertake to discuss
the law.
The next question in getting the subject
into workable form, concerns the selection
of one author whose notions are worth
analyzing. Shall it be Plato or Aristotle,
Grotius or Locke, Suarez or Holmes? Any
of these and many others are worthy of
study, but for the purpose of this paper
it is proposed to exclude them all in favor
of Thomas Aquinas. It may appropriately
be asked why, in a common law country,
one is urged to look to a medieval philosopher for an exposition of the meaning of
natural law. Not one answer but many may
be given. First of all, Thomas Aquinas was
widely read in all the writers who preceded him, drawing freely upon Plato and
Augustine, Aristotle and Justinian, Gratian
and St. Paul, as needed. Second, his viewpoint was unusually broad, embracing an
extraordinary number of aspects to many
kinds of problems which are at present of
great importance to us. Third, his method
of progressing from the observation of
facts to conclusions about them is intel-

ligible to us and the precision with which
he uses language is scientific in the best
sense. His writings are voluminous and are
available for study, many of them in fairly
recent English translations. These reasons
would be sufficient to justify concentrating
on his books were there nothing more to
be said. In the case of Thomas Aquinas,
however, there is an even more significant
reason, for he was teaching and writing
at the University of Paris at the very time
when Henry de Bracton was sitting on the
King's Bench and writing his great book
on the laws of England, just across the
English Channel. They were both outstanding men in an age of extraordinarily great
minds-minds capable of mastering architectural and engineering techniques adequate to build glorious cathedrals in all
the leading cities of Christendom, and of
providing a university system of education
which has not been successfully superseded
in the literary capitals of the world in all
the centuries since. To be recognized as
greater than all his contemporaries, as
Thomas Aquinas is, surely justifies that
attention be given to what he has to say
about law. Furthermore, since what he
wrote was contemporaneous with the formulation of the common law system as
expounded by Bracton, a reading of his
works provides us with a context which
cannot be ignored if Bracton's treatise on
law is to be fully comprehended.
Were these reasons not enough, there is
at least one other that compels our attention. Approximately one hundred years
after the Declaration of Independence had
been signed in this country, an astute diplomat, experienced teacher, and learned
bishop was elected Pope at Rome and took
the name of Leo XIII. In his own life time,
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Pope Leo had seen the exile and death of
Napoleon, the revolutions of 1848 in Europe, the movement for the codification of
German law, the beginnings of psychoanalysis, and the spread of industrialization
under the expansion of corporate forms of
ownership, along with recurrent depressions and famines. Upon becoming Pope,
the first thing he did was to advocate
renewed study of the writings of Thomas
Aquinas, and then throughout the rest of
his Pontificate he wrote an extraordinary
series of Encyclical Letters in order to
demonstrate that the teachings of Christ
and the expression of those teachings in
the writings of Thomas Aquinas contained
much illumination for those confronted by
the almost insoluble problems of modern
community life. The Popes who have succeeded Leo XIII, notably Pius XI and
Pius XII, have reinforced the work.
Furthermore, it is not exactly without
significance for the jurists of this day and
place that the revival of Thomistic philosophy inaugurated by Pope Leo XIII was
paralleled by a fresh study of the writings
of Bracton and his fellow jurists, first by
Frederick William Maitland in England,
and later by George Woodbine at Yale
University in this country. Just as seven
hundred years ago, the theories of Aquinas
could be measured by their application in
the legal practice of Bracton, so today the
legal practice established by Bracton and
his successors may be reappraised by a
fresh study of the philosophical principles
of Aquinas. Parallel readings of the works
of both men in the face of contemporary
problems about guaranteeing liberty under
law should provide a unique criterion by
which progress or retrogression can be
more precisely measured. For all these
reasons it is proposed here to concentrate

attention, not on natural law theories generally, but on Thomas Aquinas' exclusively,
in the expectation of obtaining a succinct
summation of the bases of liberty which
have prevailed in the common law tradition from before Magna Carta until long
after the formulation of the Bill of Rights.
For the purposes of this paper, a summary rather than an extensive study of
Thomas Aquinas' philosophy of law is
presented.
The scholarship of St. Thomas was evidenced early in his career when he urged
the use of original Greek texts of the treatises of Aristotle rather than the traditional
abstracts derived from Latin translations.
His earliest comprehensive work, the Summa Contra Gentiles was a critical examination of the work of Mohammedan
philosophers in Spain.
The work for which St. Thomas is most
famous was begun as an orderly digest or
summation of all his previous writings and
studies for the benefit of the students who
were seeking his guidance in achieving their
own mastery of the sciences, sacred and
profane. With his customary intellectual
and spiritual humility, he thought of the
work as a manual or handbook for students; and he frankly offered it as nothing
more nor less than a logically arranged
statement of his own reasoning and conclusions about many of the problems of
life upon which he had been consulted.
At his death he left the book unfinished,
without pride of authorship, but with a
dying declaration that everything he ever
wrote was submitted entirely to the judgment of Holy Mother Church. The title of
this last book which he bequeathed to us
is the Summa Theologica, meaning a rationalized summary of all his thoughts
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about the relation of man to the Creator
of the universe.
Much of the criticism of St. Thomas
Aquinas has come from a lack of familiarity
with his great writings and the background
in which they were produced. He has been
criticized on the one hand for undertaking
to write a definitive answer on every possible
question that occurred to him, and, on the
other hand, for offering such an encyclQpedic work as a manual for students.
Criticisms such as "authoritarian," "relies on deductive reasoning," "fails to consider facts," and so on, evidence a lack of
understanding of the intent and purpose
of St. Thomas, for they identify him with
the very obscurities which he undertook to
clarify.
He has been singled out by Pope Leo
XIII as the ablest of all the scholastics, but
it is not so much for his conclusions but
his method of reaching them that he has
been held up as a model for our time.
In the small treatise, De Legibus,5 St.
Thomas Aquinas mentions five kinds of
law: Divine law, eternal law, natural law,
human law, and positive law. In addition
to indicating 1) that law differs from counsel in that it has coercive power; 2) that
it is more than a mere lawgiver's will ii
that it necessarily concerns the common
good; and, 3) that it is directed to human
reason, he points out that law includes both
general principles and particular rules or
applications. It is his discussion of the latter, with particular consideration of human
law, that will concern us chiefly here.
Divine law he defines as the very mind
and will of the Creator of the universe. 6 As
5 SUM MA THEOLOGICA, ]-It, qq. 90-96.
6 Id., I-ll, q. 93, art. 4, ad 1.

law in general is a rule and measure of
human acts, 7 so Divine law is a rule and
measure of all things.8 As the end is the
first principle in all matters of action 9 and
as the end of Divine government is God
Himself, 10 so Divine law is not distinct
from God's Will or His essence. 1 It would
appear that St. Thomas uses Divine law
12
and eternal law at times interchangeably,
but at other times he speaks of eternal law
as the "plan of government in the Chief
Governor"; 1 3 as the type of the Divine
government; 14 or as the idea of the government of things in God. 15 However, human
knowledge of eternal law cannot be other
than imperfect, 16 since each person's
knowledge of it is limited according to his
own capacity.' 7 Furthermore, he can know
it, not as it is in itself, but only in its
effects.' 8 For these reasons, no person can
judge of eternal law. 19
Natural law is a participation in human
beings of the eternal law, St. Thomas
says. 20 Not only human beings but all
things partake somewhat of the eternal law
insofar as it is imprinted upon them 2 1 and
they are moved to obey it by the natural
inclinations 22 impressed or imprinted on
7 Id., q. 90, art. 1.
8 Id., q. 93, art. 1, ad 3.
9 Id., q. 90, art. 1.
1O Id., q. 91, art. 1, ad 3.
I IId., q. 93, art. 4, ad 1.
12 Id., qq. 93, art. 4; 93, art. 5; 91, art. 2.
13 Id., q. 93, art. 3.
14 Id., q. 93, art. 4; 93, art. I; 93, art. 5, ad 3.
15
16
17
18

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

q. 91, art. 1.
q. 91, art. 2.
qq. 91, art. 3, ad 2; 93, art. 2, ad 3.
q. 93, art. 2, ad 1.

19 Id., q. 93, art. 2, ad 3.
20 Id., q. 96, art. 2, ad 3.
21 Id., q. 91, art. 2.
22 Id., qq. 91, art. 2, ad 3; 90, art. 1, ad 1; 91, art.
6; 94, art. 2.
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them by the Creator. 23 Irrational creatures
are moved to act through being moved by
Divine Providence 24 without any knowledge or free choice on their part, but solely
by reason of their participation in' the eternal law. Human beings are moved to act
in accordance with eternal law, first of all
through being so inclined or disposed as
other creatures are, but they are also
moved to act by knowledge 25 and under26
standing of the Divine commandment.
It is the power of rationality which distinguishes man from the rest of creation that
he sees about him, and it is the appeal it
makes to his reason which distinguishes
man's participation in the eternal law from
that of other created things. 27 Principles of
reasoning are known naturally 28 by man
for no other reason than that he is so
created by God. Man thereby participates
in eternal law not only by inclinations which
move him to act but also by sharing in the
eternal Reason 29 which enables him to
know. This participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is called the natural
law and is nothing else than an imprint on
us of the Divine light.3 0 It is in virtue of the
natural law therefore that man has his first
31
direction of acts to their proper end.

from the common to the proper. 33 This
process differs somewhat in the two aspects
of reason, the speculative and the practical.3 4 In order to understand just how
limited our knowledge of natural law really
is, it is necessary to follow St. Thomas'
thought about the different operations of
the speculative and practical reason. That
which, before anything else, falls under
apprehension is being, the notion of which
is included in all things that man apprehends. 33 It is the speculative reason which
is busied chiefly with necessary things things which cannot be otherwise than they
are.3 6 Because it is concerned with things
as they are, its proper conclusions, like
universal principles, contain the truth without error.3 7 However, proper conclusions
are not known to all men 38 but only the
principles which are spoken of as common
notions.3 9 Now if the knowledge of truth in
speculative matters is thus difficult for man
to attain, it is much more so in practical
matters relating to action, for St. Thomas
says plainly that:
[I]n matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of
detail, but only as to general principles; and
where there is the same rectitude in matters
of detail, it is not equally known to all. 40

The first direction of human acts is a
very imperfect guide, nevertheless, because
the knowledge it gives is limited.3 2 As St.
Thomas explains, the process of reason is

In order to be sure that his meaning is
understood, he restates the same notion in
a slightly different way, where he says:

23 ld., q. 93, art. 5.
24 Ibid.
25 Id., q. 93, art. 6.
26 Id., q. 93, art. 5.
27 Id., q. 91, art. 2, ad 3.
28
Id., q. 91, art. 2, ad 2.
2
9 Id., q. 91, art. 2.
30 Ibid.

31 Id., q. 91, art. 2, ad 2.
32 Id., qq. 91, art. 3; 91, art. 3, ad 1; 91, art. 3,
ad 3.

As regards the general principles whether
of speculative or practical reason, truth or
33 Id., q. 94, art. 4.
34 Ibid.
35 Id., q. 94, art. 2.
36 Id., q. 94, art. 4.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
.39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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rectitude is the same for all, and is equally
known by all. As to the proper conclusions
of the speculative reason, the truth is the
same for all but is not equally known to
all ... But as to the proper conclusions of
the practical reason, neither is the truth or
rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
41
the same, is it equally known by all.

the second way have no other force than
44
that of human law.

Efforts of human reason are required
whenever conclusions or determinations are
reached, since the knowledge needed in

45
both cases is not imparted to us by nature.
As St. Thomas puts it:

Just as, in the speculative reason, from

It is not only with respect to reaching
true conclusions that human reason finds
difficulty in knowing what the law is. A
rule of action may also be derived from the
natural law in another way. To quote St.
Thomas again:
It must be noted that something may be
derived from the natural law in two ways:
first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly by way of determination of certain
generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while
the second mode is likened to that whereby,
in the arts, general forms are particularized
as to details . . . Some things are therefore
derived from the general principles of natural law by way of conclusions . . . while
some are derived therefrom by way of determination, e.g. the law of nature has it
that the evil-doer should be punished; but
that he be punished in this or that way, is a
42
determination of law of natuie.
The distinction so made between conclusions and determinations is very important
in showing the relationship between natural

naturally known indemonstrable principles

we draw the conclusions of the various
sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by
efforts of reason, so too it is from precepts
of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that human reason
needs to proceed to the more particular
determinations of certain matters. These
particular determinations, devised by

human reasons, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law
(i.e. ordinance, for the common good,

made by him who has the care of the coin47
munity, and promulgated) 46 be observed.
The indemonstrable principles referred
to in this paragraph are explained elsewhere, where St. Thomas, after observing
that being is the first thing that falls under
the apprehension, 48 continues:
Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be
affirmed and denied at the same time, which
is based on the notion of being and notbeing: on this principle all the others are
based . . . Now as being is the first thing

that falls under the apprehension simply, so
good is the first thing that falls under the

law and human law. Both modes of derivation are found in the human law43 says St.

apprehension of the practical reason, which
is directed to action; since every agent acts

Thomas, but those which are derived by
way of conclusions are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively,
but have some force from the natural law
also. But those things which are derived in

41
42

Ibid.
Id., q. 95, art. 2.

43 Ibid.

for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle in the practical
reason is one founded on the notion of
4

4 Id., q. 91, art. 3.

45 Ibid.
46 Id., q. 90, art. 4.
47 Id., q. 91, art. 3.

48 Id., q. 94, art. 2.
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good, viz., that good is that which all things
seek after. Hence, this is the first precept of
law, that good is to be done and pursued,
and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts
of the natural law are based upon this: so
that whatever the practical reason naturally
apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs
to the precepts of the natural law as some49
thing to be done, or avoided.
It is to be noted that these first indemonstrable principles cannot be argued about,
since they are by definition indemonstrable.
They may be either accepted, as they have
been for centuries by most people, or rejected, as they are by a few philosophers
like Hegel who substitutes becoming for
being, and replaces the first principle of
identity (or contradiction) by the premises
of thesis and antithesis, attaining thereby
a new synthesis. These premises of his
thereby become matter for argumentation
as well as subject to acceptance or rejection.
The necessity of the first indemonstrable
principle is not at all to be found in giving
us desired answers without the efforts of
reason, but rather in pointing out the limitations of reason. If one were to paraphrase
St. Thomas' first definition of law and take
it out of context-by saying merely that law
is a rule and measure of acts ...

and ... the

rule and measure of human acts is reasonan undue burden, much heavier than that
which it actually has, would be placed upon
human reason thereby. St. Thomas himself
supplies the corrective when he points out
that:

ther statement that "the natural reason is
the rule and measure of human conduct,
although it is not the measure of things that
are from nature."' 5 1 Now, since it is the
practical reason which is concerned with
conduct, and since the practical reason is
concerned with the particular and contingent, rather than with the necessary, the
human laws which it devises cannot have
that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of the sciences. St.
Thomas speaks in several places of "the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on
contingent and particular matters. '52 Indeed he goes so far as to say that:
[I]n contingent matters, such as natural and
human things, it is enough for a thing to be
certain as being true in the greater number
of instances, though at times, and less fre53
quently, it fail.
There is another way in which the relationship between natural law and human
law makes a correct statement of the law
difficult to formulate and that is in its application. On this point St. Thomas says that:
The general principles of the natural law
cannot be applied to all men in the same
way on account of the great variety of
human affairs; and hence arises the diversity
of positive laws among various people.54
Elsewhere he refers to differences in persons, 55 as, for example, between children
and adults, where the measure is not the
same 56 and as between the virtuous and the
vicious, where, the motivation being different, 57 the application also may vary.

Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of
things: but the principles impressed on it by
nature, are general rules and measures of
all things relating to human conduct. 50

51 Ibid.
52 Id., q. 91, art. 4.

In this way is to be understood the fur-

54 Id., q. 95, art. 2, ad 3.

53 Id., q. 96, art. 1, ad 3.
55 Id., qq. 93, art. 2, ad 2; 91, art. 3, ad 1.

49 Ibid.
50 Id., q. 91, art. 3, ad 2.

56 Id., q. 96, art. 2.
57 Id., q. 93, art. 6.

